TR EMERITUS

Written by Our Correspondent A video clip exhorting Singaporeans to vote for change in the next general election by famous online film-maker Wendy Neo has garnered more than 8,000 views within a few days of publication. Wendy Neo is famous for the production of videos critical of the PAP. She wrote on her Youtube profile that she is currently an undergraduate in Perth and will become an Australian citizen after she turned 21 years of age. The title of her latest video is: "Singapore General Election 2010 新加坡大选: BERUBAH 改变 மாற்றம் CHANGE": The video began with a summary of proposed changes in policy such as a minimum wage system, first world salary for Singaporeans, increased healthcare subsidy and retirement for the elderly followed by snapshots of the main opposition leaders in Singapore. The middle portion of the video clip showed an elderly lady picking cardboards for a living with a background voice saying in mandarin: "For the past forty years, I have been voting for the Foreigner Action Party (PAP) and this is what I get in return. How did things turn out this way? What happened? Now they say I am old and useless and want to dump me at JB for me to die overseas. My fellow Singaporeans, please save me which is also saving yourselves. Please remember: what happened to me now will happen to you one day." The clip then showed photos of PAP MPs enjoying themselves and urged Singaporeans not to give up their opportunity for change. Though the video clip lasted only less than 3 minutes, the message is clear and concise: vote for change and vote out the PAP! The opposition should make use of such video clips as part of their electoral campaign to get their message out to Singaporeans. To ensure that they are influenced to vote against the PAP, they must play on their emotions - their fears, anxieties, worries, anger, frustration, resentment and angst. Contrary to what the PAP would like us to believe, politics is all about emotions. The opposition must capitalize on the groundswell of dissatisfaction, unhappiness and disgruntlement against the PAP and utilize it to its benefit. Netizens can help by: 1. Sharing the video clip with your relatives from the older generation who do not surf the internet. 2. Forward the video link to all your friends and colleagues or by embedding the video on your blogs. 3. Download and burn the video clip to CDs and distribute them to the residents living in your block. If each of us were to do our part right now, our combined efforts will soon snowball into a massive grassroots movement to advocate for change in the coming election.  Read More →

I refer to the letter by Mr Ng Kwong Yee dated 8 Feb 2010. (see below) Mr Ng chides couples for expecting their first home to be first rate.  What should couples expect then?  That their homes should be third rate?  What will that make of Singapore?  Third rate? Mr Ng also claims that couples are unwilling to live in new, outer suburbs.  But is it just distance or location that is the issue here?  The 'unwillingness' to live in new, outer suburbs may stem from the long waiting period of three years rather than the location.  Furthermore, new flats in outer suburbs aren't exactly cheap nowadays either.  If a couple is going to pay top dollar to stay in the outer suburbs, they might as well pay a bit more to get a better location. Mr Ng says that couples dislike lower floors.  Unless Mr Ng stays on the second floor, he can keep his mouth shut. Mr Ng also says that couples want their flats immediately.  How long should couples wait then?  Three years?  It takes perhaps three years for a relationship to mature and if we are going to add another three years before a family can be started, that will be a full six years from getting to know a person to starting a family.  No wonder Singaporeans are having children later. Mr Ng feels Singaporeans should not take issue with long waiting periods for BTO flats.  We can extend this argument to all other aspects of life too.  We should not take issue with long waiting periods for buses and trains.  We should not take issue with long waits at clinics and hospitals.  We should not take issue with long waits at government agencies.  Because we the citizens of Singapore deserve to wait long long in efficient Singapore. Mr Ng says BTO flats are subsidised.  But when you compare the BTO flat you are buying today with the same one that was sold three years ago, you will find that you are actually paying 30% more.  So you end up paying more despite the 'subsidies'.  So much for subsidies. Mr Ng says it is not unusual for inner-city housing price to escalate as a city prospers.  But last year was recession year and prices went up just the same.  Prosperity has become a lame duck excuse for price escalations. Mr Ng tells couples who are not happy with BTO to buy resale flats and not complain about high premiums.  Resale flat prices shot up by 30% to 40% over three short years and buyers have no right to complain?  Imagine 10% property price inflation annually and Mr Ng tells us not to complain?  He who doesn't complain when faced with such high inflation rates must be really cuckoo. Mr Ng tells us that the government should not be held accountable.  Who else but the government that has to be held accountable for the 30% inflation in flat price over three years? Mr Ng says allowing PRs to sell their flats after a period will give them a stake here and help Singapore grow.  But after a PR sells his flat and leaves Singapore, what stake will he have here?  How is he helping Singapore to grow after taking an extra thick wad of cash from some poor fellow Singaporean? Lastly, Mr Ng says that flat price appreciation is not a bad idea since 86% of the population are flat owners.  Mr Ng doesn't understand that: 1.  Price appreciation is only on paper.  Unless the flat is sold, the paper gains cannot be realised.  But where is one going to stay after one has sold one's flat? 2.  Even if one chooses to sell one's flat, the gain by one will become the loss by another.  Therefore, flat price appreciation is a zero sum game that adds nothing to the country as a whole.  For every winner, there will be a loser.  You can't have all 86% flat owners winning together because that will require all of them to sell their flats together.  But when 86% flat owners sell their flats together, where are we going to find enough buyers to buy from them?  They will end up selling to themselves and all profits and losses will simply cancel each other out. 3.  When property prices increase, your children suffers.  Your gain will be more than outweighed by the combined losses of your children many years down the road. 4.  The only real winner is the HDB and the govt.  As new flat prices are pegged to old flat prices, the HDB will stand to make more money when prices appreciate. Thank you Ng Kok Lim Room for Pragmatism THE public reaction to rising prices of HDB flats appears to be largely prompted by young, middle class couples in the sandwich class, usually snagged by the $8,000 income ceiling. They expect their first home to be first-rate, are unwilling to live in the new, outer suburbs, dislike lower floors and expect to get their flat immediately. I hold a different view. Buyers who qualify to buy directly from the HDB should not take issue with the waiting period for build-to-order (BTO) flats. These flats are subsidised and not bought in the open market. Buyers should also be open to buying flats in the outer suburbs. It is not unusual for the price of inner-city housing to escalate as a city prospers. New buyers will just have to live farther away. Successful buyers also reject flats on the lower floors during balloting for the sale of the balance flats. If they choose to do so, it is only fair that they queue up for the BTO scheme which means a longer waiting period. Either that, or buy resale, which is dearer. Rather than complain about the high cash premiums, perhaps young couples should realise they must start saving from their first day of work if they wish to have their dream flat. The Government should not be held accountable if a buyer wishes to have a more desirable flat but does not have enough Central Provident Fund savings. It is also unreasonable to impose more restrictions on permanent residents (PRs) who buy resale flats. PRs already face more restrictions than citizens in buying public flats. Allowing PRs to buy flats, and sell them after a regulated period in the open market, will give them a stake here and help Singapore grow. The Government should come down hard on people who buy flats to rent them out illegally. Despite the rules, many flats are still wholly rented out via the loophole of a locked master bedroom. Perhaps the best way to stop this practice is to reward whistle-blowers. Finally, as 86 per cent of the population are HDB flat owners, it is actually not a bad idea for the prices of HDB flats to appreciate. Ng Kwong Yee (Source: Straits Times Forum, 8 February 2010)  Read More →

By Michael Cole from Taipei Times Book: Politics and Change in Singapore and Hong Kong: Containing Contention by Stephan Ortmann It has often been said that democracy is not endemic to Asia, or that its development is inevitably stunted by so-called “Asian values” or “Chinese characteristics.” Opponents of this view, meanwhile, argue that modernization leads to democratization as an increasing number of groups and individuals are empowered and therefore become more prone to challenge the authorities. This has led to the belief — and hope — that modernity, oft-defined as the adoption of capitalism, will transform a state from within and initiate the process of democratization. If this were the case then China, of all countries, would be expected to be the next country on the democracy waiting list. And yet, there are hardly any signs that it is about to do that. How do we explain this? As “most similar cases,” two Asian city-states — Singapore and Hong Kong — allow us to experiment with the impact of modernity on post-colonial regimes with a tradition of “soft authoritarianism.” By following the emergence of contention alongside rapid economic development in the city-states and how the authorities responded to that challenge, we can establish whether democratization is a teleological phenomenon — in other words, that modernity/capitalism inevitably leads to democracy — or if other preconditions are necessary for this transformation to occur. This is what Stephan Ortmann, assistant professor of comparative politics at Fern University in Hagen, Germany, undertakes in Politics and Change in Singapore and Hong Kong. To this end, Ortmann presents a detailed analysis of the ruling elites in Singapore and Hong Kong, as well as the oppositional groups that have challenged their authority. The author shows us that “soft authoritarian” regimes depend on performance for their legitimacy. Their ability to deliver on their promises (stability, security, economic growth), therefore, is directly related to the emergence of oppositional groups and their capacity to challenge the authorities. It quickly emerges that while the Singaporean elite has been largely successful in implementing its policies, Hong Kong authorities fared much worse. Public housing, among others, is discussed to compare the outcome of similar projects in the two city-states. Given its performance, Singapore’s People’s Action Party (PAP) was able to cultivate the belief that the stability of the state — its very survival, in fact — depends on the party. The fact that the PAP was a direct descendent of post-colonialism, whereas the Hong Kong authorities in the 1970s — the period of interest here — were British colonial and manned mostly by foreigners, also had an impact on perceptions of legitimacy. Beyond this, the strategies used by the ruling elite can be simplified to two approaches: co-optation and coercion. The section of the book that explores these two is by far the most fascinating, especially when it comes to Singapore. Co-optation was an instrument used by both one-party city-states to prevent the emergence of strong oppositional groups by bringing them into government and thereby institutionalizing the opposition. Invariably, however, oppositionists were limited in their ability to climb the hierarchy and were relegated to consultative (as opposed to partisan) bodies with very little ability to influence policymaking. What little elections were held were usually for such positions, which while not threatening the ruling elite nevertheless gave it a veneer of democracy. By Ortmann’s account, Singapore was much more successful than Hong Kong in using co-optation to pre-empt the opposition. In fact, it went to great lengths to give the public a stake in the survival of the PAP: Social engineering (quotas on ethnicity within districts, a “multiracial state”), extremely high rates of employment within the public sector and large government-linked corporations are all part of this strategy. Coercion, for its part, includes a variety of techniques, from surveillance of oppositionist groups to assembly laws, censorship of the media to defamation lawsuits. In that regard, Singapore has also been far more successful than Hong Kong, so much so that to this day oppositionists are afraid of speaking out for fear of its impact on their jobs and the high likelihood that doing so will result in a ruinous lawsuit. The portrayal by the PAP of oppositionists as “extremists” and “troublemakers” has weakened the image of dissidents with the public and compelled many to play by the rules by joining the system rather than fighting it from outside. This explains why Hong Kong, which didn’t treat oppositionists as harshly, saw far more non-institutionalized techniques of opposition, such as mass rallies, during its tumultuous years. Control of the media also plays a large role. While publications in Hong Kong were generally free, the situation is quite different in Singapore. Consequently, when the PAP fails to meet public expectations, the media will come to its defense and blame the shortcomings on some external factor or by singling out a few scapegoats. Lack of reporting on such incidents, or reporting that paints the authorities in a favorable light, therefore, has a substantial impact on public perceptions of the ruling elite. In Hong Kong, when the government fumbled, the media were able to report on it, which helped de-legitimize the elite and created opportunities for oppositionist groups. Ortmann wraps up with possible scenarios for Hong Kong and Singapore, conclusions that are far from optimistic. While Hong Kong, which was far less successful in delivering on its promises as a paternalistic state and only reluctantly used coercion to constrain oppositionists, liberalized and, to a certain extent, democratized from the late 1970s until retrocession in 1997, Ortmann raises questions about the viability of democracy in the special administrative region, mostly because of the increasingly influence of Beijing in local politics. As for Singapore, while acknowledging the role of the Internet, which the PAP has not censored as much as it has other media, and the party’s limited attractiveness for Singaporean youth, the author does not see much hope for democratization, unless a severe shock, such as the global economic crisis, undermines once and for all the legitimacy of the elite. Given that Singapore appears to have emerged relatively unscathed from the crisis, that prospect once again looks distant. While not addressing this explicitly, through his exploration of the techniques by which “soft authoritarian” regimes managed to stay in power, Ortmann shows us how certain parties in democratic states — and here Taiwan comes to mind — could deconstruct those achievements and push the country back in the other direction toward soft authoritarianism. - Taipei Times  Read More →