TR EMERITUS

From our Correspondent The SPH publication on the history of the PAP - "Men in White" which was given extensive publicity by the Straits Times over the weekend was officially launched by MM Lee Kuan Yew on 8 September 2009 at the Art House. Also present are past and present PAP politicians, and former legislative assemblymen who had fought for or against the PAP in the 1960s. The book was written by three senior journalists from the state media at the request of then Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong. They took seven years to finish the writing. Though it was touted as an objective and fair account of the history of Singapore's most successful and oldest surviving political party to date, its content was obtained largely from present PAP leaders like Lee and his Prime Minister so who granted the writers extensive interviews. Other important figures instrumental in the founding of the PAP had declined to be interviewed, including the first mayor of Singapore, Mr Ong Eng Guan who lost the nomination for the post of Singapore's first Prime Minister to Lee by only one vote. Some earlier pioneers of the PAP like Lim Chin Siong and S Rajaratnam had passed away - their accounts will be useful to make the book more rounded and objective. Writing in the book's foreward, Mr Lee said governing Singapore has become more complex. Leaders must maintain the country's security and stability, manage a more complex economy and ensure social equity between the races. Former PAP Chairman, Dr Tony Tan, said the book was not a re-telling of Singapore's transformation to a first world city, but the rise, fall, capture, split and resurgence of one of the world's most successful and longest ruling political parties. Low Por Tuck, contributor, "Men in White", said: "If the youngsters want to know the history of Singapore, they must read it - the facts and the truth." Unfortunately, while the book had dredged out new information not previously known, it had deliberately omitted some crucial facts which may aid younger Singaporeans in the understanding of the PAP's history and alter their impression of its early leaders, especially the over-hyped MM Lee. According to excerpts of the book published in the Straits Times, it had adopted the official stance of the PAP government in the relentless persecution of its political opponents in the 1960s. The PAP leaders like Lee were protrayed as "victims" of a communist plot led by the leftists within the party's ranks to subvert the government. Operation Coldstore which was launched in 1962 leading to the arrests and detentions of several PAP MPs and activists was justified on the grounds of national security though there was no strong evidence that Lim Chin Siong and his colleagues were members of the Malayan Communist Party (MCP). As Lee admitted himself, his definition of a "communist" was arbitrary and not based on whether the suspect was an official member of the MCP - he is one as one it "appeared" that he took orders from them. Again nothing was mentioned about the injustices perpetuated on the prolonged incarceration of Chia Thye Poh (32 years), Dr Lim Hock Siew (19 years) or Said Zahari (17 years) without trial. Their accounts of the turn of events were strangely absent though there was a film on Said Zahari produced by local film-maker Martyn See which was banned. Neither did the book reveal the real story behind the "Constitutional coup" of 1988 which saw Lee introducing two bills to castrate the Law Society and the Singapore media. He was opposed vehemently by ex-Solicitor General Francis Seow who went on to demolish him in a Parliamentary Select Committee debate. Its repercussions are still felt today: the Law Society is unable to comment on government legislation unless its opinion is "specifically sought after" and the media has become a propaganda mouthpiece of the PAP. "Operation Spectrum" was launched subsequently against 22 alleged "Marxists" in the same year who were arrested and detained without trial. Francis Seow, who had humiliated Lee earlier was detained himself when he turned up at Whitney detention center to provide legal aid to the detainees. He was later convicted of tax evasion in absentia and exiled to the United States. "Men in white" is nothing more than a rehash of what we know in Singapore's history textbooks except that it is now repackaged as the "untold" version of the story. With the elections looming ahead, it is an appropriate time to instill a bit of nostalgia in the older generations and to remind the forgetful youth of the debt of gratitude they owe to the PAP, in particular, its founder Lee Kuan Yew. EDITORS' NOTE: In conjunction with the book launch in commemoration of the PAP's 50th anniversary, we will be releasing a five-part series analyzing the inherent weaknesses of the current PAP and its future.  Read More →

From the Wall Street Journal Temasek released a revised charter last week that emphasized that the Singaporean state-owned fund is managed on "commercial principles" and eradicated any reference to government investment. That's a commendable goal, but it skirts the basic conflict of interest between the public interest of protecting citizens' earnings and the private-market imperative of taking risks to seek returns. This issue of transparency has come to the fore in the city-state of late because the approximately 127 Singaporean dollar ($88 billion) fund lost a bundle in last year's financial crisis and the new CEO-designate, Chip Goodyear, inexplicably resigned in July. The public uproar is loud enough that even legislators from the ruling People's Action Party have asked for more disclosure. Temasek released a raft of accompanying documents alongside the one-page charter last week to help clarify its goals. "Temasek is a commercially-driven investment company and is responsible to its sole shareholder, the Singapore Government, for delivering sustainable long-term returns," the company said. But nowhere did Temasek explain what a "sustainable long-term return" is, who sets that goal, or how it is set. Temasek adds it has "institutionalized its financial discipline" by issuing an annual report since 2004, maintaining a credit rating and issuing bonds. These steps are commendable, but they are also incomplete. The annual report doesn't give complete historical financials, nor does it say how much Temasek pays in dividends to its 100% owner, the Ministry of Finance. A credit rating is one guide to financial health, but given the agencies' recent track records, it's not infallible. As for the bonds, they are only lightly traded, meaning the market signal they send about Temasek's performance is weak, at best. The fund's relationship with government is equally confused. The accompanying documents say the government "does not involve itself in the operations and business decisions of Temasek" or "direct or influence the investment or divestment decisions of Temasek." Yet the President of Singapore must concur with board member and CEO appointments or removals and has to approve any transactions in which Temasek draws on "past reserves." The fund's Chairman and CEO also report to the President twice a year. Temasek might gain more public acceptance as a "commercially driven investment company" if it separated itself fully from government and gave Singaporeans the option to keep their money with the fund or take it elsewhere. That's called competition and free choice, and it's the only true test of commercial success. Source: Wall Street Journal EDITORS' NOTE: Temasek Review is a paid subscriber of The Wall Street Journal  Read More →

Translated by Tan Wah Hock 作者：Damon Yeo (商务通讯员) 经过数月的审视，淡马锡控股终于结束了（Chartered）特许半导体业务,将其转售给阿布扎比的ATIC。据可靠消息，ATIC 是阿布扎比政府全资拥有的投资机构，预计将支付该公司股票25亿美元并承担31亿美元的债务，始能完成这56亿美元的交易。 （在这里阅读更多） 像其他所有主要的并购交易，这一交易将影响到每一个企业股东，我会尽量像一个外科医生手操手术刀进行解剖和分析，处理三个与它有利益相关者之间的相互影响。 目前的（多数）股东 在过去的一年，淡马锡控股已经绝望卖掉特许。从已公布的财务状况进行分析，特许似乎尚留下少许值得质疑的责任。 （在这里阅读更多） 2008年，渣打出现1亿02百万美元的赤字。2009年首两个季度，他们已经亏损了1 亿4千3百万美元。 2009年下半年也预计不会被看好。 去年，该公司降至惠誉国际评级“垃圾级的” 债务等级，担心其业务运转不再产生足够的现金。这加重了该公司的债务，削弱其在债券市场上取得更多资金的能力。 （在这里阅读更多） 特许半导体由新加坡科技工程有限公司（100％淡马锡拥有）于1987年成立的合资企业。首先，它在1999年通过向交易所提出公开招集$ 5亿资金股的申请。紧接着上市后，淡马锡控股拥有约72％的股份。 （在这里阅读更多） 据最新披露的数字，淡马锡控股现持股62％，显示过去数年间他们已出售了10％。多年来，他们作为上市的一家私人公司，没有公布淡马锡控股过去数年投资特许多少资金，并在公开市场减少拥有特许股权。淡马锡至少在有关（可能在不同时间点）投资部分套现资金。 不像其他巴克莱/美林证券等失败的投资，如淡马锡的入股，后来又以较低的价格退出；淡马锡自始至终都拥有特许。任何收益或损失交易不可能量化，（如在2000年网络泡沫破灭前，其高峰期的交易时不抛售该公司股票）只能算是“纸上输”的作业。 从另一种交易的财务角度看，是有可能挽救现在投资出血的淡马锡。这需要一个“假设”分析。这一分析绝对复杂，不会在这里进一步讨论。总而言之，可以断定，淡马锡控股通过协议按照账面价值出售特许。 当前雇员 6500多个劳动力与特许半导体股东相关。它的生产设施均位于本地，因此其大多数雇员是新加坡人。 今年年初，渣打解雇600名工人以节省经营成本。 （在这里阅读更多） 新业主ATIC已经公开表示，他们正计划将其与最近阿布扎比收购的另一家Globalfoundries公司合并。 自1996年以来，首席执行官谢松辉便是该公司忠实的职员，也是这事件的首个受害者。 环球铸造厂（Globalfoundries）总裁道格琴已被委任为执行长官，因此谢君已自首席位置降级，基本上是新企业实体排名的第二人。 谢曾表示，他不期望有更多人被裁，但仍然不可能解决目前与特许处在紧张关系的任何人的问题。因为，合并和收购计划几乎随时都不可避免会导致裁员。 公民的情结 在上世纪九十年代，渣打特许一直是新加坡的旗舰生产企业巨头。这是 “对本港从轻型制造业，高科技产业经济重点发展”的宣传 “海报男孩”。当它1999年第一次在自动报价股市上市后，除其外无其二，至今它仍是新加坡在多国自动报价股市上市的五家公司之一。 有人认为特许海外投资损失是一种民族自豪感和软弱和失败的象征。但我们不能接受这个概念。 在当今全球一体化的年代，它几乎不是与民族主义挂钩的企业。特许半导体可能曾经是一个样板，但它本质上只是视为是一个已经成立而流失利润的公司，不牵涉国民感情因素。 在过去十年里，有标志性的英国汽车公司陆续售给外国投资者，也曾出现类似的英国公众不满情绪。多年来，该国公众开始意识到，其实这只是一个指标，他们正在从制造业走向更加有利可图的服务行业。今天，有豪华捷豹（Jaquar）公司由（印度）塔塔汽车拥有，沃克斯豪尔受控于通用汽车（美国）等实例。 新加坡人或许应该欢迎今年在我们经济领域直接来投资的所有外国（FDI）企业（淡马锡如何收益的管道，完全是另一场辩论）。  Read More →