TR EMERITUS

Translated by Tan Lee Chong, Chinese Correspondent (Original article by Eugene Yeo HERE) 今天(2009年3月30日)是SPH(新加坡报业控股公司)双喜临门的日子。新的公司商标被揭幕又适逢公司庆祝25周年纪念。 我不禁想知道今次再设计公司商标花费了股东多少金钱，这引我想起2005年马宝山(Mah Bow Tan)将‘滨海湾’(Marina Bay)改名回复它原来的标记时，花费了纳税人$400,000(读这里的新闻报告) 。 周年纪念庆祝会由前副总理陈庆炎(Tony Tan)主礼，并有纳丹总统(S R Nathan)和PAP部长李文杨(Lee Boon Yang)博士和吕德耀(Lui Tuck Yew)先生到场观礼。 喜气洋洋的纳丹总统回忆起他在SPH工作时的经验： ‘当我接任海峡时报领导人的工作时， ...... 当年的总理，李光耀先生，告诉了我： `纳丹，我交给您海峡时报。 它有150多年的历史。 它就像一个瓷碗。您若把它打破，我可以把它碎片再编结起来，但它不会是原来的模样。请不要尝试打破它。我可以自豪地说这瓷碗传递至我并且交给SPH的后继领导人而仍然保持完整；它实际上在我卸任以后的岁月中发出了更佳的光芒。’(读这里的全文) 如果他还活着，希特拉(Hitler)的宣传大臣约瑟夫Goebbels会为李光耀感到骄傲。 纳粹宣传持续了不够十年。 PAP的神话己经进入50周年纪念而仍然兴旺。 这SPH‘碗’ 100%垄断市场并且由政府100%拥有，怎么会打破呢？ 除北韩、中国和缅甸之外，我想不到其他国家的报业媒介是这样完全地控制在政府的手下。 在1984年8月4日，SPH由三间公司合并而成立：海峡时报报业集团(Straits Times Press group)、新加坡新闻和出版有限公司(Singapore News and Publications Limited)、和时代出版公司(Times Publishing Berhad)。后者在1988年再从SPH分拆出来。这次合并促成了英文、马来文和华文报纸都在同一间公司内经营。 SPH后来也收购了泰米尔文Murasu私人有限公司。 (读这里的文章) 1984年标记了新加坡自由和独立报业的正式衰亡，虽然它棺材的钉子早在1975年己被钉上。因为那年政府成立了报纸和印刷法例 (Newspaper and Printing Act)控制新闻印刷企业的拥有权。 通过每日推动官方宣传去辩解PAP许多有缺陷的政策和它的镇压措施去抑止民间社团和反对党，SPH的确很好地为它的主人服务。 不幸地，它的“成功”成为了许多新加坡人的悲剧。在他们长大的过程中，深信报业媒介发表的每一个词，当它为福音真理，其实它不外是服务PAP狭窄党派利益的纯粹宣传吧了。 经过25年官方认可的思想灌输，它制造了无思想的、受屈服的和无动于衷的平民百姓。他们心满意足地将国家运作全盘交给政府而毫无疑问。 与我同年纪的人很少肯花精神去读时事，更不用说他们可以看得透媒介报告中明显的不规则和不精确的报导，和肯质询我们高薪金和自赞“天才”的PAP领导人所发的费话。 这就是25年来PAP通过宣传喉舌发出不懈的宣传对我们的头脑所造成的后果。因此PAP亦无法吸纳头等人才进入政府，并且只能满意于必须支付淫秽的高薪以保留二等天才在政府之内。 在一个党与国之间界限模糊的国家，对政党行得通的东西经常对国家有卑惨的后果。 对PAP而言，绝对控制媒介是必要的，为了他们能欺凌政治天真的选民，以便它反复不断地向我们灌输令人讨厌的政策。 多年来，我们的基本人权一再被强夺了而不得任何抗议。允许外国人蜂拥地窃取本地人的饭碗而不受惩罚; GST被上升到3、5、7% 用来“帮助贫寒”。 新的HDB组屋的售价定至转售组屋的高昂价格，而它原本应是一栋便宜和付担得起的公共房屋。 CPF提款年限从55岁提高到62岁和将来或许到85岁。 我们的贫富收入差距是第一世界经济之中最高的一个，而PAP部长们却挥霍地自我支付超高的薪金。我们多年来积累的储备在少于一年之内已丢失了重大一部份，但仍然无人要负责任。 这些只是许多事例中的一少撮， PAP当我们无关痛痒的，它无需支付任何政治代价。 在其他已开发的亚洲国家例如香港，台湾，和南韩，他们的媒介担当人民的声音，将起来抗议政府。 这里在新加坡，主流媒介是PAP的同谋用来保存它的政治霸权。 大卫马歇尔(David Marshall)的确是一矢中的地描述海峡时报新闻工作者是“可怜的妓女和PAP的走狗”。 不是所有的SPH新闻工作者都应受责备的。 一些新闻工作者是真正有良心的而且肯承诺他们的专业道德的，但他们没有一点工作空间，因为资深编辑全都是PAP的心腹。 毫不奇怪地，几位SPH编辑在为党 “专心一致地服务”几年后已“进升” 为PAP 议员，成汉通(Seng Han Thong)和伍碧虹(Irene Ng)是典型的事例。 没有一个自由和独立的报业作为国家的第4根支柱，新加坡的未来是非常可怖的。 我们没有选择，只是与PAP一起浮或沉。 如果他们下沉，我们将与他们一起下沉，因为在他们的系统之外并没有人可以替换他们。 一个可信任的其他党派能在新加坡诞生以致检核PAP的最大绊脚石是SPH。几乎在每次大选，当PAP应该集中精神于全国重要关键问题时， SPH的编造专家(spin doctors)便被传召出来去拆毁反对派。 在2006年，我们看见了媒介怎么举行了7天的抹黑运动来反对工人党候选人詹姆斯戈麦斯(James Gomez)一点琐细的差错。 在2001年，抹黑运动的目标是徐顺全(Chee Soon Juan)博士。 在1997年，目标是邓亮洪(Tang Liang Hong)他被丑化为一个中国沙文主义者(Chinese chauvinist)，在1991年 Jufrie Mahmood不合理地被攻击为一个马来沙文主义者(Malay chauvinist)。 在势均力敌的选区，SPH适时地干与，为PAP额外地扭转了败局。Jufrie Mahmood赢取了在Eunos GRC 49.1%的有效票数，而JBJ和邓亮洪在Cheng San GRC赢取了45.3%。 若果在1997年新加坡人投票选了5名反对派议员进入议会，今天情况会怎样呢？ 我们在自己的出生地是否继续受PAP所抑制呢？ 我们会找不到到我们国家储备现有价值的答案吗？这就是为什么PAP在议会中不想要有“真正的”反对派使它向人民负责，并且SPH需要由一个前PAP副总理任主管到今天。 当SPH和PAP庆祝政府支持的思想控制25周年的压倒性胜利，让我们能逃脱它无所不在的影响而没有受伤的这一少撮人，在此哀悼自由和独立的报业的衰亡。  Read More →

Some things in life can get you killed – nope, I am not talking about the second hand smoke type of death. I am talking about the king cobra variety where you’re dead in 3 minutes flat. I am talking about the things that seem benign, harmless and even safe like tucking into rojak or chocolate cake; but nonetheless they pack as much punch as one swipe from the reapers scythe – people who deal with death all the time know this only too well. Don’t believe me go and ask any policeman who has ever worked in homicide and he will tell you – if you’re going to be slashed to death or stabbed, 9 out of 10, its going to be that dinky fruit knife or letter opener on your desk – its never going be a commando knife – if you’re going to die on the road; 9 out of 10 its not going to be on a stretch of road that you’re driving for the first time; its probably going to be the route you take every single day. Death can come anytime, anywhere and it lurks in the most unexpected of places – now most people will say that will never ever happen to them; but you know what; when they say things like that, they’ve just overlooked the very thing that will probably kill them. Like I said earlier death lurks in the most unexpected places; that why I’ve decided to come up with this write up to give all of you a heads up on what I consider to be the top 5 killers of all time. So let’s dive in starting from No.5 5. Things from above – you know what most of us don’t look up; but if like me you spend a lot of time playing spycraft and reading up on Mossad and CIA techniques – then you must know that if you’re going to die unexpectedly, it probably going to come from above; that’s why snipers and dominant girls like to on top – it plays on our natural blind spots. Did you know once I cheated the grim reaper during a holiday in Malaysia by just shifting my sun lounger just away from a tree and within seconds a monster coconut that must almost weigh as much as a bowling ball just went clunk, broke the table into half like a karate chop – we are talking serious kilograms here; so if that thing ever hit me – that’s it. Now I am not saying that you should go around with an army helmet when you next decide to sunbath – only be mindful of stuff coming down from above! And that includes cats, aunties, fridges and even the odd lightning bolt – as the Merlion found out when he was minding his business vomiting water, now URA is going to put horns on him (lightning arrestors), I really don’t know which is worse. 4. Mondays. Did you know that 90% of heart attacks occur on Mondays between the period of 9 to 11 in the morning – I bet you didn’t know that – Mondays are hazardous to your health; and one reason why Mondays are natural born killers is because most of us dread to return to work – so our blood pressure goes up; pupils dilate and our glands start producing heart attack inducing chemicals. In fact, I hate Mondays so much, I just wiped it out from the calendar – what I do is treat Monday as an extension of a very long Sunday. So if you want a promotion or get on top of your boss; just ladle the bad news thick and fast on a Monday; when he starts to turn purple and bluish – that just means, you’re getting ahead in life. 3. Food. Now the reason why food is a killer is because we eat a lot; if you consider that we put stuff into our mouth 3 times a day and in between munch on other stuff as well, then in the course of a year; we are really talking about somewhere between 10,000 opportunities to die while munching on something. The thing that kills you with food could range from anything from dodgy chocolate cake (that people wipe their ass with) to puffer fish, but usually what nails you is just getting choked. Stuff just gets stuck in your windpipe and you just suffocate and die. Doesn’t take too long either about 3 minutes, that’s really how long you can hold out. So remember if that ever happens – just make sure you take off all your clothes and climb on the table and start jumping up and down. Hopefully someone in the restaurant will think its such a revolting sight they may even take it personally and give you a really hard rugby tackle thereby giving you something close to a Heimlich thrust. Remember don’t be shy about it – I rather be naked any day then dead. 2.Cars happen to be up there in the hall of fame of natural born killers – only because no one ever believes they’re going to die in a car; but I can think about 50 ways to die in a car; anything from spontaneous combustion to deadly carbon monoxide seeping into the passenger compartment – one good way not to die in a car is to make sure you never confuse your car with your living room – don’t put anything on your dashboard, bc when the airbag goes off, the last thing you want is to get a stainless steel buddha impaled in your head or something.  The No.1 Killer is Love. The undisputed five chili killer has to be the love of your life - its so dangerous, I call this the silent death. Don’t believe me go and check out how many crime of passions and suicides are the result of relationships gone awry – that’s why choosing who you’re going to go with is probably the most important decision you will ever make in your life; if you fuck this part up; I guarantee you; it will kill you faster than cyanide – remember it pays to make certain you’re not going out with some psycho woman. Most men don’t bother with the details when they’re dating; most don’t even bother to check out the goods – remember when it comes to people who you’re considering going the long haul with, it just doesn’t pay to be shy on foreclosing on the whole idea of caveat emptor - for me, I don’t mind fake boobs, but I draw the line on fake people  – usually men miss out on what I call psycho char bor cue signs like -   Men: What’s your hobby? Siaow Char bor: Oh I am into cats.. And they stop right there, then never ever go further; till they get hitched up with cat woman only to find out she just happens to the mother Teresa to all the lost cats in Singapore – by that time its too late as they’re probably sleeping in cages in cat urine reeking habitats. You get my drift – be mindful of the psycho signs. And pay attention and stay alert (please check up one of my post on interrogation techniques, this will close the loop on this write up.) The way I see it, go for the level headed ones – that way, if you need something stable to make up for your incomplete ikea collection; you could just as well use her as a side table to put your tiger beer and peanuts on for your football matches. But the best thing that you can do to avoid getting killed by someone who you really love; is learn to love yourself first; that may sound selfish and narcissistic; but how do you even give love to another, when you don’t even love yourself?  In short never ever give yourself to another at the expense of cannibalizing on your own sense of worth and self esteem – if you’re going to give a 100% by all means give it the full toss of a decent 100%, but always make sure there is a 100% that loves yourself just as much – that way should it come to a sudden unexpected curtain call – you don’t ever do something stupid. You can close that chapter of your life under your own terms and move on with dignity - matters little whether its a failed relationship, job or even something that you once did but shouldn’t have done. Darkness 2009    Read More →

By Dr James Gomez, Author, Self-Censorship: Singapore’s Shame EDITORS’ NOTE: (Self-Censorship: Singapore`s Shame written by Dr. James Gomez ten years ago  focuses on the political behavior of citizens and foreigners living and working in Singapore. He is currently revising his book to consider the impact of the post-internet environment. Dr. Gomez invites readers and bloggers to post their reactions, suggestions and comments to his draft chapters which will be serialized here each week.You are invited to join his Facebook Author’s Support Group at http://www.facebook.com/group.php?gid=59118927883  and check out his blog at http://www.jamesgomeznews.com/blog). His posting last week “Introduction” can be found here.) When it comes to discussions of political culture, a commonly phrase used is the "culture of fear". In Singapore, a culture of fear is seen as driving self-censorship. This culture of fear is something that has been constructed by the PAP government through its historical tightening of political controls in spite of its occasional rhetoric of openness. This deliberately manufactured fear is aimed at securing social and political control over citizens and foreign residents in Singapore. It is the reason why people become anxious about political participation and justify self-censorship because a culture of fear exists. How has this fear been created in Singapore? The culture of fear is related to political development in Singapore. Discussions on the political development in the city-state have been reviewed from a number of perspectives over the last three decades. One writer attributed this political conservatism to the ideological hegemony of the ruling party and to Asian values (Chua, 1996). While another argued that the economy of Singapore was used to as tool of social control and to nurture political conservatism in the republic (Tremewan, 1994), others have suggested that the character of the middle class has something to do with this state of affairs (Rodan, 1992; Jones and Brown, 1994). The tactics of the PAP and its authoritarian character have also been identified as having explanatory potential (Rodan, 1993). Much earlier, local political scientist Chan Heng Chee had explained conservatism as a result of "politics" being absorbed into the state bureaucracy (Chan, 1975). Former prime minister Lee Kuan Yew's political style, together with his use of legal action at the courts, have also been proffered as contributing to the state of political conservatism here (Haas, 1999; Seow, 1994 and 1998; Selvam, 1991; Minchin, 1986). However, the centrality of Lee's role in Singapore politics is now being challenged on several fronts. For instance, one book that tries to map the contributions of his other colleagues (Lam and Tan, 1999) while others include political autobiographies such as that of Said Zahari (2001 and 2007) which collectively challenge the centrality of Lee Kuan Yew in Singapore`s political history. The contemporary structures of changes in Singapore have also been identified as shaping political conservatism in Singapore. Analyses have focused on the strategies of the PAP, the institutional restrictions against independent political expression and the reforms that have taken place to "accommodate" the demand for greater political participation (Heng, 1997; Rodan, 1997; and Lam, 1997) as well as restrictions place over the internet, political films and public protests. Issues concerning elections have also been considered relevant to the local political culture. One writer has provided an overall description of the Singapore electoral system and the accompanying changes over the years (Thio, 1997) while another has focused on the failure of the electoral system in representing alternative voices (Rodan, 1996). There are also several local academics have sought to explain the general and other elections in Singapore (Mutalib, 1992 and 1993; Singh, 1992; da Cunha, 1997). In my own PhD thesis on the impact of the internet on the electoral system, I concluded that political culture contributed in part to upholding the electoral system in Singapore that continuously returns the PAP into power (Gomez 2008). Some works on civil society, mainly emanating from PAP government think-tanks, seek to make a distinction between civil and political society (Ooi and Goh, 1999). Others claim that civil society will be the site of future political contestation (Tay, 1998). Implicit in local discussions on civil society is that "neutral" or "non-partisan" political culture of such groups is the preferred choice. There are only a few studies that have directly commented on political culture and behaviour in Singapore. Most works on the Republic's political development, if they refer to political behaviour, use the term "political culture" (Soin Tan, 1993; Khong, 1995; Jeyaretnam, 1997), though it is not adequately explained, described or gauged. Often, it is mentioned in passing, without any depth of deliberation. Most discussions on self-censorship have often been used in relation to the media and local media in particular. The application of the concept self-censorship has only been used in a limited way to explain Singaporean political culture. Almost none discuss its role in a post-internet environment in Singapore. Discussion on domestic political culture often go back to the features of traditional heritage, religion, political history of the region and ethnic origins of the migrant population in Singapore. Conventional explanations often state that the nature of political conservatism on the island can be attributed to ethnic culture. Understood in rigid ethnic categories, Singapore is made up of 75% Chinese, 14% Malay, 6% Indians and 5% Others. However, such categories are increasingly becoming irrelevant as more foreigners from non-traditional sources of immigration countries such as the Burma, Nepal, Philippines, Vietnam and elsewhere settle and work in Singapore. One piece of work that attempted an ethnic explanation was an early study, which focused on the Chinese community (Clammer, 1985). The writer argued that their large numbers in Singapore sinicised the political culture of the Republic. Hence, the disdain that the Chinese hold for politics is reflected across the board in Singapore, he said. The writer pointed out that the majority Chinese, as opposed to the minorities, are politically conservative. He believed that this was one reason why political development in Singapore has largely mirrored the cultural conservatism of the ethnic majority. He offered as reasons, the social structure and attitudes of the Chinese community towards politics. The PAP government has been able to manipulate and stretch this cultural argument to all ethnic communities in Singapore, in the 1990s, to sell the idea of an "Asian values" system, which tries to render democracy as a culturally Western-style alien concept. Modeled after Confucianism, Asian values instead are said to entail a belief in good government by honest men and includes a reverence for authority. As such, direct opposition is not to be encouraged; instead, consensus building is to be supported. While arguments from ethnicity can hold some explanatory relevance, the uncritical use of ethnic explanations for political behaviour, needs to be guarded against. For instance, it is important to recognise that Singapore`s minority communities in the broad sense of the word are generally not involved in politics. In political parties, especially opposition parties, ethnic minority community participation is small, token or non-existent. Minority communities in Singapore have essentially abandoned politics and live their daily lives as a community unto themselves. Often the plural ethno-religious make up of the city-state is used to pre-empt political change. Pictures of ethnic strife drawn from two early riots in the Republic's history have been well utilised in government discourse to help the citizens and foreign residents to internalise risk aversive behaviour when it comes to politics. On the basis of frailties of statehood and a narrow range of policy instruments available for ethno-centered policies, the use of culture in this way aids the retention of the existing system. The argument from ethnic culture attempts to paint alternative views as dangerous, anti-establishment, unreflective of aspirations of the majority and as "fringe" interests. In this way, it perpetuates popular attempts to endanger and marginalise alternative views. For instance, demands for political space are often represented as the wants of minorities. The demand for political space is frequently depicted as a concern only of ethnic minorities, the English-educated, sexual minorities, academics and eccentric elements of society. Additionally, the push for liberal values and democracy is portrayed as the demand by a small group of people who use such 'romantic' notions as a strategy to gain political attention. But the explanation via ethnicity does not clarify why political participation in other East Asian countries such as South Korea and Taiwan is large and highly impassioned. Further, it does not explain why a very disparately constituted group of Chinese-educated, blue-collared workers and the man in the street elbowed for political space some 40 years ago in the Republic. There is nothing inherent in Asian cultures that make self-censoring a necessary feature. Instead, much of the promotion of group solidarity and the rejection of self-assertion and individual rights are systemic of Asian one-party dominated regimes or military dictatorships such as in Burma, China, Laos, Vietnam and even Japan. Thus, there is a need to go beyond ethnic culture to look at structures to explain the political culture that is uniquely Singaporean, cutting across ethnic lines and affecting even those of other nationalities residing in the Republic. There is something deeper than ethnicity that explains the state of political culture and fear in Singapore. Economics has also been used to explain local political behaviour. Linked to the presence of a patron-client relationship between the PAP and the majority of the voters, the economic success of the republic is said to have created gratitude, loyalty and dependency among citizens and foreigners residing in Singapore for the ruling party. The fact is the PAP government is literally the largest employer in terms of percentage of total jobs in the economy. This position as the lead employer includes the number of government jobs (not just civil service, but includes all quasi-government and non-government entities that receive government funds or come under some form of government control). Add to this the percentage of total value of the stock market under state control (through Temasek, Government Investment Corporation, etc) versus that which is in truly private hands (bearing in mind that a lot of 'private' owners are active participants in the patronage system). Work in also the size of small and medium enterprises versus the size of MNCs and PAP government controlled businesses (Singapore Airlines, SingTel, etc) and this shows the link between the level of self-censorshiphow much the PAP government controls the livelihood of its citizens and foreign workers. Most people are not willing to do something to jeopardize their career or livelihood. The connection of the Republic's economic success to the PAP is manifested in the way individuals and groups preface remarks about politics, especially their desire for greater political participation, with accolades for the ruling party and its leaders that is at the same time coupled with expressions of gratitude and loyalty. It is a ritual that is clearly observable at local conferences, meetings and speeches at events. The political behaviour of the middle-class is highly relevant in any study of the nation's economic culture. Based on it; size, some commentators note that middle-class behaviour represents the political culture of Singaporean society. They argue that the republic's large middle-class, whose material consumption is linked to the state, does not want to upset the status quo. This special dependency is in part supported by the people's obsession with material gain. Since citizens and foreign workers alike in Singapore are motivated by the need to constantly gather material advantage and get ahead, a national trait referred to locally as kiasuism is seen as an intrinsic character of this middle class. The ruling party taps this deep-seated desire of the people for materialism and therefore continually plays the economic card for its political ends. Feelings of anxiety and uncertainty displayed by the economically dependent middle class' whenever the ruling party raises the spectre of economic downfall have been linked to the slow rate of the democratisation process in Singapore (Jones and Brown, 1994). Even though some have endeavoured to show that the middle class itself is complex (Chua and Tan, 1995), economic dependency has been accepted as one explanation why the Singapore middle-class does not initiate political change. One writer speaks in terms of an ideological consensus between the PAP government and the electorate that has been based on a shared interest in economic growth (Chua, 1998). In 2008 when the mini-bond issues broke out in Singapore following the collapse of the Lehman Brothers, the initial crowds that gathered at the Speakers Corner eventually dissipated without building on the momentum for mass political action. But the similarity between the political culture of the elite class and the masses, arising out of a centralised and punitive political system, goes beyond economics and the citizenry. This phenomenon has also affected the behaviour of foreign residents in the Republic and other foreigners who have dealings with the country. Those who do not publicly subscribe to this larger political culture or have actively taken part in what is seen as antagonistic political activity have been deported or their resident, work or student permits terminated or not renewed. This larger impact of political culture reveals lacunae in theories of democratisation that expected a course of political action from the middle-class. Another account of political conservatism in the Republic focuses on the popular fear that the PAP will persecute any independent political expression. This fear originates from the perception that the government takes punitive action against its political opponents. In Singapore, there have been numerous examples of individuals who have challenged the political leaders of the country and suffered from detention without trial or have had defamation, bankruptcy and tax evasion suits filed against them. The challengers' names and characters have been subjected to negative campaigning through a compliant local press. Such examples of negative campaigning of civil society activists and various opposition politicians in the past and present stay vivid in the minds of the people and perpetuate the fear. Memories lead opposition figures subjected to negative campaigning include Chia Thye Poh, Tan Wah Piow, JB Jeyaretnam, Francis Seow, Chee Soon Juan, and in 2006 when I contested the general elections against the PAP, I joined the ranks of these figures as PAP objects of negative campaigning. Fear is also due to the presence of the Internal Security Department (ISD) and its surveillance of political activities. The ISD makes its surveillance activities fairly visible, especially during opposition party activities or when political figures meet members of foreign embassies, overseas opposition politicians and civil society actors. The surveillance also covers religious activities, academic, social and theatre gatherings. Tertiary institutions such as polytechnics and universities are also monitored by handlers through student and academic informers. The public can get a fairly detailed account of the workings of the ISD, and its detention and interrogation techniques from Francis Seow's book To Catch a Tartor: Dissident in Lee Kuan Yew's Prison (Seow, 1994), supplementary information can also be found in (Tan, Gomez, 1999) and ( Hong 2009; Tan, Teo and Koh 2009). There is also an informal culture of curiosity over each others` perceived political activity and the accompanying rumour mongering that acts as a mass surveillance device that feeds the formal surveillance network. The fear against surveillance is so widespread that presence of the ISD is evoked even when lay people speak of politics, make telephone calls or send messages via the Internet or post articles on blogs. With the arrival of the internet, there is a perception and acceptance that internet content is constantly being monitored by the authorities. Further, online anonymity that features prominently in internet chat rooms and in the comment sections of blogs is accepted as non-existent. The belief is that the PAP government and its agents have the technical and financial means to track every single anonymous online entity and that "radical" bloggers are invited out for a chat by government agents and persuaded to moderate their stance! Adding to this, are revelations that a Singapore-based company has supplied sophisticated intelligence gathering equipment to Burma's military-rulers that is capable of intercepting all sorts of telephone and fax messages as well as e-mail and radio communications aggravates the situation even further (2nd September, Far Eastern Economic Review 1999). Fear has also been attributed to an underlying apprehension that the vote is not secret, that voting against the ruling party could have a negative impact on voters' livelihood, or that any alternative political views that individuals may have might be held against them. This mind-set is prevalent among many civil servants, employees in government-linked companies, and those who see themselves as being in one way or another connected to the state for their livelihood in Singapore. Being the largest employer and financial patron on the island, the PAP government has a psychological influence over the way a significant number of the people vote during elections. In 1997, the direct threats to withhold funding for precincts voting against the PAP had an immediate influence on voter behaviour (da Cuhna, 1997). In the last two general elections in 2001 and 2006, the PAP has turned to giving cash incentives such as Singapore Shares and other cash rebates to appeal to voter materialism. Perceptions of a whole network of informal pressures that pulsate through the state machinery also contribute to fear. This is believed to take the form of "advice" and "pressure" put on civil servants or those in employment outside the civil service but who are nonetheless susceptible to pressure in having their actions deterred or curtailed. A frequently cited example is that immediate superiors advise their junior workers on the wisdom of engaging in particular political activities or associating with certain individuals and their causes. Failing to adhere to such advice is viewed as courting risk in losing one's job, being demoted, being passed over for promotion or transferred to lesser departments in the organisation. It is easy to agree that fear caused by perceptions of the surveillance and intimidation activities of the ISD, the wrath of the service machinery plus informal government pressures can be a powerful deterrent to alternative political activity and thought. However, ethnicity, economics and fear offered as individual explanations of a typically Singaporean political culture are not satisfactory. They do not demonstrate clearly the relationship between the political structure and behaviour, and how the two are part of a complex interdependent and mutually constitutive relationship in a dominant one-party regime. More importantly they do not reveal the dynamics of political self-censorship and the act of censoring others that are central to how this political culture manifests itself in material form. Thus other perspectives and ideas are needed to complement present understandings of how the system is constantly reproduced. Culture is often treated as an abstract value system but it has its physical manifestation in people's behaviour. The structural determination of a dominant Singaporean political culture and its material manifestation are significant. Censorship should not be understood in negative terms as an "absence" or failure in political life, of what is not done, but as an active material behaviour that itself shapes events in the real world. Censorship impacts on political structure and participation and is in turn constituted by these. Simply put, the current system is responsible for facilitating the censorial behaviour one witnesses in Singapore and such behaviour in return helps keep same the structure and fear in place. Each is necessary for the other. In such an environment how does one think of political development or reform? What is the way forward? What strategies should one adopt?  In the next chapter, Singapore's political history is briefly surveyed to trace the emergence and character of this dominant culture of self-censorship and the act of censoring others. It shows that it is mainly in contemporary Singapore that such a censorial climate emerged - a consequence of a systematic attempt by the PAP to contain alternative political expression.  Read More →