TR EMERITUS

By Gabriel Sim, Guest Columnist While Temasek is losing its investment touch, Alvin Foo of the ST is losing his sense of proportion and reality (as you will see from his article attached below). With great conviction it is declared that Temasek out performed nearly very index and person worth noting (Buffet no less), but it comes with a caveat: "assuming the value of its portfolio remained unchanged since November last year".   What value is there in making a comparison for a 10 yr period that ends in March 2009 when the data is only updated to November 2008??   It is also quite convenient that the period of comparison ended at March 2009; a period that many analysts consider to be the bottom of this economic downcycle. Temasek's recent investment disasters were offload either prior to or during this period. This meant that they did not benefit from the vicious rebound since the march lows to date. Would Temasek still beat the street if the months of april to june were included? It probably would if you continue to only consider their holdings as of Nov 2008.   The first 3 months of 2009 were torrid times for ALL investors, including Buffet that earnestly came out and declared he had make big investment mistakes in late 2008 and apologised to his shareholders.Did Mdm Ho make such public apologies for her countless blunders? No. She had no regrets and picked up an award for it.   We must also understand that Buffet's Berkshire Hathaway is unlike Temsasek which has constant captial injection (tax payers money). This naturally puts Temasek at an advantage as we all know the market moving power of big money. And without fear of losing this captial injection, Temasek can basically throw caution to the wind and place their bets at the roulette table knowing full well that their chips will be replenished every month at a rate of 33% of gross salary.     http://www.straitstimes.com/Breaking%2BNews/Singapore/Story/STIStory_392459.html   SINGAPORE investment agency Temasek Holdings may have taken a hit recently on some of its high-profile banking investments, but over the longer term it has outperformed key global benchmarks.   Figures obtained by The Straits Times show that over a 10-year period to March this year, Temasek outgunned several closely-watched equity indexes.   It also beat other notable long-term investors such as Berkshire Hathaway, a top US investment company headed by billionaire Warren Buffett.   Temasek's performance has come under scrutiny in recent months after it suffered significant losses earlier this year on investments in Western banks Barclays and Bank of America (BoA). The state investment house delivered an annualised total shareholder return by market value of 5.4 per cent from March 1999 to March this year, assuming the value of its portfolio remained unchanged since November last year. That is the date of the last available update of the value of its investments.   This compares with a return of 4.5 per cent in the same period for the MSCI Asia Pacific excluding Japan index, 3.1 per cent for the MSCI Singapore index, and -3 per cent for the MSCI World index, according to figures obtained by The Straits Times.   MSCI indexes are key indicators commonly used by institutional investors to see how well they are doing relative to the market.   Temasek's main investments are in stocks, with the bulk of its assets in Singapore and Asia, so these indexes are regarded as a useful gauge of its performance. Temasek's returns were also better than that of long-term investors like Swedish investment firm Investor AB, which delivered 3.7 per cent, and Berkshire Hathaway, which yielded 0.7 per cent.   Last month, Finance Minister Tharman Shanmugaratnam told Parliament that Temasek has performed 'respectably' compared to relevant market indexes and reputable institutional investors.    Read More →

Extract from The Secret Journal of Premier Zhao Ziyang EDITORS' NOTE: The following is taken from "Prisoner of the state: the secret journal of Premier Zhao Ziyang". Zhao was China's Premier from 1980 to 1986 and General Secretary of the Communist Party from 1987 to 1989. Together with Hu Yaobang, he was considered one of the key reformers responsible for China's transition from a centralized to market economy. He was purged by the Party following his refusal to obey orders to impose martial law in Beijing during the Tiananmen protests. In spite being a Communist bureaucrat in his entire political career, Zhao demonstrated a clear and concise understanding of the inherent weaknesses of a one-party system. In comparison, Prime Minister Lee recently proclaimed that a one-party state is the only viable political system for Singapore. We had to change the way we governed, but how were we to make these changes? I had gradually developed some ideas on how to accomplish this. Given that the Communist Party was the ruling party, how should it govern? My idea was to modernize how it governed, so that it could become more modern, civilized, enlightened, and open. First, we needed to increase the transparency of Party and state decision making. The major activities and decisions of the Party and the state needed to be made public. This would have changed the long-standing 'black-box' operation, where the public is only given the final result of a decision. As soon as the government announced a decision, it moved on to implementation, but people were not privy to the process by which the decision had been made. This is very important. People have the right to know. Next, we needed to establish multiple channels for dialogue - with various social factions, forces, and interests. Decisions on major issues should be made with ongoing consultation and dialogue with various social groups, not just within the Communist Party, and not only after merely consulting once with key figures of other political parties. Of course, we had to permit social groups to exist; otherwise, how could dialogue be conducted? Most important, we needed to change the situation in which all social groups - including workers' unions, youth organizations, women's organizations, chambers of commerce, and others - were all in monotonous unity with the Communist Party. They should not be treated like the Party's royal instruments. They have to be able to truly represent the people they are meant to represent. Only dialogue conducted with groups of this kind would carry any real meaning. In other words, their functions as intermediate organizations should be fully developed. The Communist Party should not take control of everything or interfere so much in their affairs, and should give them room for independent activities. Under such conditions, the Communist Party should hold dialogues and consult with various social groups, enabling these groups to have real political participation. Moreover, the ruling party must respect the separation of Party and state. The Party's leadership should be essentially political and not interfere in so many other domains. We also needed to enrich the level of cooperation with other political parties and let other parties enjoy true political participation with functions of dialogue and mutual checks and balances. Furthermore, we needed to protect citizens' rights in concrete terms. This was extremely important. We also needed to allow greater press freedom, though under management and leadership. In 1989, I talked to (chief editor of the People's Daily) Hu Jiwei about whether we ought to allow independent newspapers. Currently, all news media are monopolized by the Party and the state: this is not right. At that time, I had not considered permitting a completely free press, but wanted to allow a controlled process of opening up. At the very least, material that Party- and state-controlled media were not willing to run could be published by other media. Even if we did not allow full press freedom, we should allow airing of public opinions. At that time, I was thinking about how to allow more political participation - under the Communist Party's continued ruling position - from various social groups and interest groups, and especially by intellectuals. Even without a multiparty system, we should have expanded various forces of political participation as much as possible. These are the ideas that gradually formed in my mind from 1986 to 1989. The Party's ruling position would not change, but the way it governed had to. That is to say, under the basic framework of the Communist Party's leadership, we would allow more political participation from various social groups; "rule of law" would gradually replace "rule by men"; and many of the wonderful things defined in the Constitution would be realized, one by one.  Read More →

略谈PAP的 “软功独裁主义”战略的演变 Original Blog Written by Ng E-Jay HERE 在1987年5月21日，二十二名新加坡公民，其中包括年轻社会工作者、律师、商人、剧院从业员和其他专业人士，在内部保安法(ISA)之下被扣留了，他们被指责为一个危险马克思主义阴谋的成员，意图用暴力推翻政府和用一个马克思主义的政权来替换它。他们都未曾给于一次公平的审判，并且时至今日，没有证据支持他们被捕的指责。 当萧添寿(Francis Seow)先生设法向这些“马克思主义的共谋者” 提供法律顾问的协助时，他也被扣留了。 其他著名的政治活跃分子在ISA之下被拘捕的例子包括：不用审判而被扣留23年的谢太宝(Chia Thye Poh)，和同样被扣留17年的Said Zahari。 我最近在互联网上发现这篇优秀的文章题为“新加坡独裁统治的年代史” ，它列出在过去几十年用于抑制政治反对派的压迫战术的许多例子，其中包括诽谤的诉讼、警察的搜捕、媒体的审查、政治影片和广播的控制、和利用法例去制裁和平的抗议和合法的政治活动例如售卖政党的时事通讯刋物。 然而近年来，李光耀政权采取的“强硬压抑”(hard repressive)战术，己慢慢地虽然不是完全地被李显龙政权的“软功独裁”(soft authoritarian)战略替换了。抑制的异议(stifled dissent)现在越来越被操纵的异议(managed dissent)所替换。 开放演说家的角落(Speaker’s Corner) 作为我们的第一个例子，自去年9月1日演说家的角落已被开放为抗议和示威的场地。 政党例如SDP和NSP、提倡者例如”没有战争的世界” 和陈钦亮先生成功地使用这场地来促进他们的奋斗目标(causes)，他们的意图和看法得到了公报的时间，或者对于某些他们关心的问题简单地公报了他们的立场。他们所有的努力是应该被祝贺和受到鼓励的。 然而由于时间的过去，较少人注意到以下的事实：开放演说家的角落仅是象征式的自由，这措施并不充分地恢复了新加坡人的言论自由与和平集会之权利，正如我们的宪法 第14条所阐明的。 直到目前为止，只有新加坡民主党(Singapore Democrats)对于这个论点保持了醒覚。 以下例子表明了开放演说家的角落仅仅是一份表面文章(tokenism)的事实：警察禁止了Thamilselvan Karuppaya先生的意图示威去提倡在樟宜机场的公众标志(public signs)上运用泰米尔语(Tamil)，这示威原本在去年9月举行。 (参考这里) 当局开放演说家的角落为抗议和集会的场地，这手段的本质卓越之处在于它外表上给于我们政治空间，并且在受控制情况之下让活动分子伸诉他们的委屈和促进他们的奋斗目标，但与此同时，亦使到非暴力反抗(civil disobedience)更加难以辩护为合理、并且掩饰了政府没有恢复我们宪法权利的事实。 如果畅言无忌的反对派不迅速地适应这个新品牌的软功独裁主义，反对派将会冒被隔离(isolated)之险，并且被围困在当局配置的框框之内(boxed in)。 公共秩序法(Public Order Act) 我要提出的第二个例子是公共秩序法，它是坏法例被制定得更恶劣的另一例子，外表上公众被给与了更大的自由，但围绕着民主鼓吹者的圈套则被拉紧，因为他们不会满足少于宪法给予他们的全部权利。 公共秩序法许诺豁免更多种类的非奋斗(non-cause related)活动无需领取许可证的要求，但更加进一步削减新加坡人和平集会的权利，它宣称任何抗议甚而由一个人发起的抗议可以被视为非法，并且增加了非暴力反抗(civil disobedience)的惩罚。 (参考这里) 当局声称面对转变中的地缘政治气候(geopolitical climate)，公共秩序法的立法是用来应付保安和公共安全的需要。但实际上，现有的法例已经充分应付恐怖分子的威胁或者其他犯罪活动所引起的保安问题。 因此，执政党意欲利用新的法例作为软功压迫(soft oppression)的主要武器是非常清晰的。 然而，除了某小群另类媒介(alternative media)之外，其他组织对公共秩序法并未发起强烈的反应。 因为法例的主要条文仅是针对一小撮的民主鼓吹者，这是可理解的。 此外，公共秩序法与开放演说家的角落是同时间被引进采用的，引致平民大众认为他们的空间在任何情况之下尚未被限制。 坏的法律被制定得更加恶劣，但在主流公众没有反对之下它获得了通过。由于该法例非常精确地针对它意欲的目标组织，它留给了普通公民一个无害的感觉。 无选区议员(NCMP)计划 我想要举出操纵异议(managed dissent)的最明显的例子就是：最近在议会中由总理提出的修改无选区议员(NCMP)计划。 NCMP计划的修改许诺提供在议会中更多反对声音，实际上它不外是PAP设置的一个政治上的“心理陷井” 。无选区议员(NCMPs)能辩论问题直至黄昏日落，但因为他们没有全面的选举权，对于发起真正的政治改革运动或者强迫政府注意人民的需要等等工作，无选区议员是有心无力的。 修改NCMP计划也不外是心理操纵人民的手段，由于保证将有至少9名反对党员在议会中因而希望人民避免了投反对党一票。 只要选举系统不透明，在新加坡的竞选是不会自由和公平的，并且反对派在竞选期间没有一个平实均匀的比赛场地(level playing field)，扩大的NCMP计划只是嘲弄民主的一个笑柄。 再説一次，这手段的本质卓越之处可参见于某些主流反对党失误地向这计划提供象征式的支持，实际上这计划仅是合适于象征式的反对党。 如果主流反对派不小心，修改后的NCMP计划将会增加他们党内部战斗和竞争的可能性，并且引至党员开始为了争取PAP剩余的饭菜而大打出手。 有如开放演说家的角落一样，修改NCMP计划是让操纵的异议(managed dissent)在一个受控制的形式之下举办，根据执政精英们(ruling elites)支配的条件(dictated terms)。 这些计划允许了更多声音能被听见，但总是在执政党的监视之下。一方面对他们视为可接受的组织给于象征式的空间，另一方面对那些他们视为威胁到他们政治霸权的组织则会更加压制。 最阴险的是，如果执政的精英们(ruling elites)能够打响如意算盘的话，服从它的主流反对派也许成为了进一步保护执政精英自己的优势和霸权的一种如意工具，并且进一步排斥了被视为眼中钉的某些反对派和活跃分子。 结论 执政的PAP对民主鼓吹者和真正的反对声音并未松开它的圈套。 他们仅仅变得更加聪明，对他们视为“温和”或“有建设性”的人群给于更多象征式的空间，但对 “畅言无忌”的人群则被限制在一个更紧密的角落，然后设下诡计使一小组人与其他人互斗。 公众的教育程度一直在提升，并且在这数字电脑的时代，人们通过互联网越来越与世界其他地方得到了联系。 信息的障碍经常被打破。 PAP政权知道在现今的年代，越来越难辩护“强硬压抑” 的战术，例如利用内安法(ISA) 去应付政治对手。反而， PAP政权逐渐采取了 “软功独裁” 的方法：对公众和他们批准的反对声音给于了象征式的自由，同时非常精确地去反击另外的其他人打击他们的要害。 执政党知道某些核心活跃分子的小组并不会简单地走开。 因此，他们新的战略是制定计划和策略致使一小组人与另一组人互斗，并且对媒介维持牢固的控制保证公众情绪不会向他们视为不利的方向有所动摇。 当局知道，如果人民不可能发泄怨气，政治环境有一天将会爆炸，好象在马来西亚发生的事件一样。 因此他们的战略是让怨气在受控的方式之下发泄，防止民主潮流沸腾起来。 抵抗新的独裁主义的第一步就是要清晰明确地揭露它的真面目，有碗说碗，有碟话碟。 对此，我敦促所有民间社团和反对派不要被这个门面上的开放所蒙骗，并且避免成为PAP的 “划分并且征服”(divide and conquer) 把戯中的无知小角色。  Read More →